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LIABILITY OF PERSONS REQUESTING APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL
OFFICER FOR HIS ACTS.
In Samuel v. Wanamaker, 24 N. Y. Law Journal, 215 Sup.
Ct., App. Div.) it was held that a special officer appointed pur-
suant to the charter of New York, but at the request of the defend-
ant, in so far as he acts independently of the person requesting
his appointment, is solely responsible for his acts. In considering
this subject there are three distinctions to be noticed among the
cases. The first class includes those wherein it was held that
such special officer was not an agent or servant of the person
requesting his appointment. The second class comprises those
wherein it was recognized that he had an official character, but
that, nevertheless, his employer was chargeable as for the acts of
an agent. The third class comprises those cases in which the
plaintiff's own words and acts contributed to the suspicions caus.
ing his arrest; and it was immaterial whether the officer acted as
an agent or in his official capacity inasmuch as there was no lia-
bility in either case. Formwalt v. Hylton, 66 Tex. 288.
The first class of cases seems to incline toward this proposi-
tion that it is the intent of the law to invest the special officer
with all the rights and immunities of a regular policeman. If this
were not so and the person appointed had not such powers and
privileges, the appointment would be rendered nugatory. The
authorities also agree that the mere fact that the officer's salary
is paid by the person requesting his appointment does not deprive
the policeman of the broad authority specially delegated to him.
So it was held, he was not the mere servant of a person who paid
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
his salary and whose premises he was appointed to watch, and
such person was not liable for his official acts. Hershey v. O'Neill,
36 N. Y. x68; Healy v. Lathrop, x7 Mass. 263. So, where a
special officer makes an arrest for disorderly conduct, the pre-
sumption is that he acted in his official capacity as an agent of the
state. Tolchester Beach Imp. Co. v. Steinmeier, 72 Md. 313. But
this presumption is one of fact and may be rebutted. Brill v.
Eddy, 15 Mo. 605. And where a special officer makes an arrest
he should show his warrant. Frost vt. Thomas, 24 Wend. (N. Y.)
418. So where a passenger had been arrested without a warrant
for alleged non-payment of fare-but the alleged offense was not
committed in the presence of the officer arresting-the company
may be liable for damages in an action for false imprisonment.
Krulevitz v. Eastern Ry. Co., 143 Mass. 228. And to charge the
employer of a special officer for liability, it must be shown either
that there was express precedent authority for doing the act, or
that the act has been ratified and adopted. National Bank of
Commerce v. William Baker, 77 Md. 462; Carter vt. Rowe, 51 Md.
298. So a railway company is not liable for an unlawful arrest
not directed by it, and outside a conductor's authority, unless it
subsequently ratifies the same. Gardner v. Boston and Me. R. R.,
72 N. H. 413.
The cases which are apparently in coliflict with Samuel v.
Wanamaker can, however, be distinguished. Without examining
them all in detail the following general principle is undoubtedly
true. The right of selection lies at the foundation of the respon-
sibility of a master or principle for the acts of his servant or
agent. Kelly v. Vew York, ii N. Y. 436; Walcott v. Swampcolt,
i Allen (Mass.) 151. So a police officer may be a civil agent.
And where he is in the employ, and under the direction, and sub-
ject to the control and interference of a person, he becomes
thereby that person's servant and is in no just and accurate sense
an independent officer. Gerhardt v. Savings Institution, 38 Mo. 60;
Walker v. Railroad Co., 39 L. J. C. P. 346. And where a ser-
vant was also a city police officer, and, through excessive vio-
lence, injured a boy wrongfully jumping cars on his employer's
property, the fact that he was such an officer will not relieve the
company from liability. Brill v. Eddy, 115 Mo. 596. And where
the code enacts "That the conductor of every train of railroad
cars shall have all the powers of a conservator of the peace" the
company is not relieved from liability, although the arrest was
made in good faith and on probable cause. Gillingham v. Ohio
River R. B. Co. 35 W. Va. 588. The rule may also be deduced
that, where an employer authorizes arrests to be made whenever
the officer thinks necessary to preserve order, or to see that his
stock of goods be not depleted, and such officer makes wrongful
arrests, such employer is liable, for he has made the officer his
agent. So, although an honest mistake is made, his official char-
acter will not avail the principal of such agent. Dickson v. Wal-
dron, 135 Ind. 507; Tyson v. Bauland, 68 App. Div. (N. Y.) 3xo;
85 App. Div. 612. Where an officer is called in to enforce the-
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atre regulations, the theatre is liable, but if he discovers the vio-
lation of a city ordinance, and makes an arrest without either the
implied or express authority of the theatre, and although he was,
prior to such arrest, the agent of the theatre, yet his act was an
official one, and he is solely liable. Jardine v. Cornell, 50 N. J.
Law 485.
In this connection there is an interesting case to be noted.
The Massachusetts Code provided that persons requesting the
appointment of a special officer should give a bond to the city
treasurer, "to be liable to parties aggrieved by offldal misconduct
of such police officer to the same extent as for the torts of ser-
vants and agents in their employ." It further provided that re-
covery could be had upon the bond as upon the bond of a constable.
But the court held that this provision did not make the officer the
servant of the person at whose request he was appointed. Healy
v. Zathrop, supra. Where an officer is an agent, and exceeds his
authority in a particular case, the principal may yet be liable.
Eichengreen v. Sourville, 35 Fed. Rep. i6. The question as to
whether the officer acted within the scope of his employment is
for the jury. Duggan v. Railroad Co., z59 Pa. St. 248; Tyson v.
Bauland, supra. The underlying principle of all those cases
wherein it was held that the special officer was a servant, and,
therefore, the employer was liable, was well stated by the court
in Mallach v. Ridley, 24 Abb. N. Cas. (N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 172, as
follows: "The employers can not confer authority upon the
employee and claim the benefits of his action when he acts advis-
edly, and absolve themselves from all risk when he acts on insuf-
ficient evidence."
FORGERY AT COMMON LAW AND ITS EXTENSION UNDER STATUTES.
The case of People v. Abed, 34 N. Y. Law Journal 189 (N. Y.
Ct. of App.), decided recently, announces a doctrine of forgery
little short of revolutionary in its departure from the rules of com-
mon law governing this crime. The decision is an extremely
important one in the development of the criminal law and, merits
the careful attention of the American bar.
The case under consideration involved the construction of sec.
5x4, subdivision 3, of the New York Penal Code, the provisions
of which, so far as pertinent to the case, are as follows: "A per-
son who . . . shall alter (utter) . . . any letter . . . purport-
ing to have been written . . . by another person . . . which
said letter . . . the person uttering the same shall know to be
false . . ., and by the uttering of which the sentiments, opin-
ions, conduct, character, prospects, interests or rights of such
other person shall be misrepresented or otherwise injuriously
affected . . . is guilty of forgery in the third degree." The
court held that the uttering of a false writing, with knowledge
of its falsity, by which writing the sentimetits, opinions, conduct
or rights of another person are misrepresented, constitutes the
crime of forgery under the statute. The mere misrepresentation
is made the gist of the offense, and proof of injury to the one whose
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name is forged, or intent to defraud on the part of the defendant,
is held not necessary to convict.
No extension of forgery to take in so many acts criminal in
their tendency is to be found in all the centuries of legislation on
the subject, as is made in this case. Writing, some years ago, a
leading authority said: "From the earliest times to the present
a legislative mania seems to have prevailed on this subject of for-
gery. The reader has seen that the common law is broad enough
to cover all sorts of forgeries, which in their nature can be harm-
ful either to individuals or the community, yet this has not satis-
fled the law makers, who, nevertheless, have piled statutes on
statutes upon the top of the common law to overwhelm it."
Bishop, New Criminal Law, sec. 548. It would be interesting to
read what that eminent author would have written had he had
this decision before him, placing forgery yet further away from
the formulas of the text-books.
Forgery at the common law is the false making or material
altering, with intent to defraud, of any writing which, if genuine,
might apparently be of legal efficacy or the foundation of a legal
liability. Bishop, NVew Criminal Law, see. 423. There were, there-
fore, three elements essential to the crime: a. The making must
be false. Reg. v. White, i Den. C. C. 208; Barnumr v. State, '5
Ohio, 7x7. b. It must be with intent to defraud. Rex v. Powell,
2 W. Bi. 787; U. S v. Moses, 4 Wash. U. S. 726. c. The instru-
ment must be of legal efficacy to impose a liability. State v.
Briggs, 34 Vt. 5o. The early English statutes relating to for-
gery had, for the most part, to do with the making of particular
forms of it felony. Legislation in the American states has been
largely along the same line. At common law forgery was a mis-
demeanor. In no instance has either statute or judicial decision
removed from the requisites of forgery the first essential, i. e., that
the making of the instrument must be false. In some states stat-
utes have been passed rendering it unnecessary to allege or prove
an intent to defraud on indictment for particular species of for-
gery, thereby eliminating the second essential of the common law
crime. A statute of Pennsylvania declaring it forgery to utter a
false diploma is an illustration of such legislation. McClure v.
Corn, 86 Pa. 353.
The decision in People v. Abet!, supra, however, entirely sweeps
away the second and third essentials of the common law crime
and establishes an entirely different set of component parts, which
are: a. The uttering of a false writing; b With knowledge of its
falsity, and c. The misrepresentation by the false writing of the
sentiments, conduct or rights of another person. It will be ob-
served that the first essential remains the same as at common law.
There is a marked difference between the issuing of an instru-
ment, "with knowledge of its falsity," and issuingthe same "with
intent to defraud." Equally apparent is the great change in the
third essential, by which the scope of that essential is enlarged to
take in instruments beyond those affecting mere property rights
and to include such subjects as sentiments, opinions or conduct.
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The breaking down of this third essential of the common law
crime, I. €.that the forged instrument must be of apparent effi-
cacy to impose a liability, is the most striking differentiation of
the new forgery from the old. In fact, under the New York decis-
ion, there are but two essential facts to be proved. They are (x)
The uttering of the false writing. (2) The knowledge of its falsity.
The third element, misrepresentation, is inferred from the false
writing itself.
It is interesting to note that, while no statute has been given
the extreme scope of this case, yet there is a line of decisions both
in England and in this country which has gone almost as far and
has positively disregarded the rule that an instrument to be the
subject of forgery must be of apparent legal efficacy. These cases
relate chiefly to letters of recommendation or testimonials of good
character, holding such instruments susceptible of forgery. In
Reg. v. Sharman, Dears. C. C. 285, the issuing of a false letter to
enable a person to obtain a situation as schoolmaster was held to
be forgery. To the same effect is Reg. v. Toshack, 4 Cox C. C.
where, for the purpose of obtaining a berth as a seaman, a false
testimonial of character was issued. In Reg. v. Mah, 7 Cox C. C.,
the defendant, with a view to obtaining a situation as police con-
stable, issued a false letter of recommendation and his conviction
on the charge of forgery was sustained. The two leading Amer-
ican cases which follow the English cases cited are State v. Ames,
2 Greenleaf (Me.) 265, and Com. v. Coe, x1 Mass. 481. This line
of cases has, however, been much questioned and a leading text-
writer on criminal law says they are at least extreme. Clark,
Criminal Law, 338 N.
In view of the unprecedented breadth of the statutory crime
as construed by the New York court and the incongruous situa-
tions that may arise from its strict application, as pointed out by
Cullen, Ch. J., in his strong dissenting opinion, it seems extremely'
improbable that either the wisdom of the legislatures or the learn-
ing of the courts will be invoked again in the near future to fur-
ther develop this peculiar aspect of the crime of forgery.
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS OF LIBELOUS MATTER.
It is well established that statements made with the bona fide
intent on the part of the person making them, to protect his own
interest in a matter where it is concerned, are privileged communi-
cations. The question is, how far does this privilege extend? Can
a person, even to protect his own interest, make libelous statements
to anyone, regardless of the fact that such persons may have no
connection with the matter?
This question is answered in the case of Sheftall v. Central
of Georgia Ry. Co., 51 S. E. 646 (Ga.). Sheftall, a passenger
conductor, had been discharged from the service of the defendant.
At the time of his discharge he held a number of unused and un-
cancelled tickets, which were good for passage over the defendant's
line of railway. The defendant issued a bulletin, beginning as
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follows, "Tickets lost and scalped," and containing the above facts.
This bulletin was issued to defendant's conductors and, was also
placed in a public and conspicious place where it was read by
other employees and by the public. Held, That the communica-
tion to the conductors was privileged, but the communication to
the other employees and to the public was not within the privilege.
This case lays down the rule, that the communication, of such
libelous matter, is privileged only so far as it is necessarily
made to others than those concerned in the subject matter of the
publication. The statement must not only be no broader than
the protection of the involved interest demands, but it must not
be made to persons having no interest in the subject matter.
A circular letter sent out by a firm, stating that a certain per-
son is no longer in their employ, and advising their friends and
customers to give him no recognition on their account, is not a
privileged communication. Warner v. Clark, 45 La. Ann. 86 .
But a publication issued by a railroad company to its division
superintendents, of a list of employees discharged for cause, issued
to prevent unsuitable men from being re-employed on other parts
of the road, is a privileged communication. Missouri Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Beehee, 2 Tex. Civ. App. io7. These two cases clearly show
to whom such communications may be made and still be privileged.
The persons to whom the statement is published must be limited to
those to whom the interest to be protected requires that such in-
formation be given. Matter not necessary for the protection of
the interest involved must not be embraced within the statement
or the privilege will be lost. The privilege may also be lost by
the use of violent language, when it is clearly unnecessary or by
a method of publication which gives unnecessary notoriety and
publicity.
"Where the expressions employed are allowable in all re-
spects, the manner of publication may take them out of the privi-
lege. Newell on Slander and Libel, 477. But mere publication
to persons not interested will not ipso facto take the case out of
the privilege. This question is well settled both in England and
in the United States. Some courts have gone further than others,
however, in extending the privilege. The Supreme Court of
Michigan, in the case of Bacon v. Michigan Central Ry. Co., 66
Mich. 166, went so far as to declare a blacklist within the
privilege.
The presence of third persons may have been merely casual
and not sought by the person making the statement, or the presence
of such third person may have been due to the act of the party
complaining of the publication, and of course in such cases the
privilege is not lost. The statement must be made in good faith.
A truthful statement, made to the parties interested, will be taken
out of the privilege if made maliciously and with the purpose of
injuring the plaintiff. Rice v. Simmons, 31 Am. Dec. 766. Good
faith is essential in all cases.
In brief, we find that in action of libel it must appear that
there is a statement made in good faith to persons interested, that
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such a statement must be published upon a proper occasion and in
a proper manner, and solely for the purpose of protecting some
interest, or the defense of privilege will fail. The absence of any
one of these essentials is fatal to the defense.
SALES OF MERCHANDISE IN BULK.
The remarkable rapidity with which the legislatures of the
different states have passed laws favoring certain classes of people,
has kept in the public eye the ever vexatious question of the proper
limitations upon the police power of the state. And as this is nec-
essarily a question of opinion and discretion, we are not surprised
at the conflicting decisions on that subject. The recent case of
Wright v. Hart, 34 N. Y. Law Journal, 165, (N. Y. Ct. of App.).
seems contrary to the weight of authority, but was decided con-
sistently with the position the courts of New York have taken, in
tending to regard such legislation as unconstitutional.
The case turned on the constitutionality of a New York statute,
Laws of 19o2, c. 528, which provides that a sale of an entire stock
of merchandise, or any portion of merchandise, other than in the
ordinary course of business, shall be fradulent and void unless the
seller and purchaser shall, at least five days before the sale, make
an inventory as. therein provided, and unless the purchaser shall
make certain inquiries of the seller and give the creditors of the
seller notice. In this case the plaintiff, a trustee in bankruptcy,
sought to set aside the sale of his bankrupt's stock of goods to
the defendant, on the ground that it was made without complying
with the provisions of the statute. The Court of Appeals, by a
scant majority, reversing a like majority of the Appellate Division,
sustained the defendant's demurrer, holding that the statute is in-
valid becaus6 (I) it deprives the vendor and vendee of liberty and
property without due process of law, by interfering with the free-
dom to contract; and because (2) it deprives them of the equal pro-
tection of the laws, in that the provisions of the act are. ,aimed at
merchants only and do not affect any other class of the community.
In his majority opinion, Justice Werner, strongly condemns the
constant legislative encroachments upon the rights and liberties of
the citizen under the guise of its police power. "Such a statute,"
he says, "sweeps away the constitutional rights of liberty and prop-
erty of a limited class of citizens who are entitled to the equal pro-
tection of the laws with all other citizens." It denies the right of
a specified class of citizens to sell a particular kind of property; it
makes no distinction between honest and dishonest sales; it re-
stricts the right of contract so as to deprive property of its
characteristics as such. The right to use, buy, dnd sell property is
protected by the Constitution, and when the law destroys its value
and strips it of the attributes by which alone it is distinguished as
property, the owner is deprived of it according to the plainest in-
terpretation of the constitutional provisions enacted expressly to
shield personal rights from the exercise of arbitrary power.
Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378-389.
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In a strong dissenting opinion, Justice Vann contended that
such a statute is a valid exercise of the police power in that it
was passed to prevent fraud and is similar to acts passed in re-
lation to chattel mortgages and conditional sales, and being uni-
form in its effect upon all persons to whom it applies is not in-
valid because it applies to a limited number. And in the first case
decided on this subject, the court held that such an act was not in
restraint of trade, as the act in question did not prevent the sale of
stocks of goods in bulk, but merely restricts the application of the
proceeds when the stocks are sold in that manner. McDaniels v.
Connelly Shoe Co., 30 Wash. 549.
On the other hand, in Miller v. Crawford, 2o Ohio, St. 2o7,
such a statute was declared unconstitutional because it place an
unwarrantable restriction upon the rights of the individual to
acquire and possess property, and because it discriminated in favor
of a limited class of creditors. It is to be noticed, however, that
this statute went further than the others in that it made the
violation of its provisions a misdemeanor punishable by fine and
imprisonment.
In considering a similar statute, which exempted from its oper-
ation, however, sales by executors, public officers, etc., the court in
Squires & Co. v. Tellier, 185 Mass. 18 remarked, "The object
of this statute is like that of our numerous statutory provisions,
which authorizes attachments on mesne process and require nothing
unreasonable." But under such circumstances, the property in
most cases ought not to be sold in bulk without first giving
creditors an opportunity to consider what ought to be done with
it. And the Connecticut court, in upholding such a statute, asserted
that the legislature undoubtedly has power to adopt reasonable
measures to prevent fraud in the sale of merchandise and such an
act is clearly within that power. Walp v. Moor, 76 Conn. 515.
And even admitting that such a law applies alone to merchants
and not to other persons, such as farmers, traders, etc., it is a valid
exercise of police power because it prevents fraudulent practices
and secures to creditors a just participation in the distribution of
the assets of such merchants. Neas v. Borches, io9 Tenn. 398.
But Justice Wilkes, in his dissenting opinion in that case remark-
ed that "to take from property its chief element 6f value, and to
deny to the citizen the right to use and transfer it in any proper
and legitimate manner, is as much depriving him of his property
as if the property itself were taken."
In Block v. SwartZ, 27 Utah 387, as in the Ohio case, where
noncompliance with the statutory provisions was made a crime,
such a statute was held unconstitutional, since it did not apply to
sales of the same character by merchants not owing debts, but
applied to, and renders criminal, similar sales by merchants who
are debtors. But an act which made such sales prima facie and
not conclusive evidence of fraud was adjudged valid, the consti-
tutional question not even having been raised by the highest courts
in Maryland and Wisconsin. Hart v. Roney, 93 Md. 432; Fisher
v. Hermann, 118 Wis. 424.
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Thus though within the past two years twenty states have
passed such statutes, in the majority of which they were upheld,
yet the law on the subject is by no means settled and until the
Supreme Court of the United States passes upon it, the question
whether such acts transcend the proper sphere of the police power
will continue to form the subject of conflicting decisions.
We wish to call attention to an error in the November issue,
where the article entitled, "International Agreements Without the
Advice and Consent of the Senate," was attributed to James T.
Barrett, instead of James F. Barnett, as it should have been.
